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NORTH AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN
TROY DAVIS EXECUTION EXPOSES 
INEQUITY BETWEEN THE CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT CASES WITH DNA 
EVIDENCE AND THOSE WITHOUT
Since 1989, 273 people have been 
exonerated in the United States through 
DNA evidence; including seventeen people 
who were executed before DNA was able 
to prove their innocence. While DNA 
testing has undeniably been a silver bullet 
in exonerating those who were not guilty, 
only about 10 percent of criminal cases 
actually have DNA evidence. Individuals 
seeking to assert post-conviction evidence 
in cases without DNA evidence are forced 
to navigate undefined standards of proof, 
leaving them in an often intractable legal 
situation.
Troy Davis, who was executed in 
September 2011 for the murder of off-duty 
police officer Mark  MacPhail, was among 
those in the ninety percent of cases that 
lacked DNA evidence. Instead, the convic-
tion was based solely on nine eyewitness 
reports, seven of which were later recanted 
citing police coercion. Yet Davis’s post-
conviction challenges in state court, his 
habeas corpus petition in federal court, 
and his petition for Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court were all denied.
In capital punishment cases, like 
Davis’s, the Supreme Court has failed to 
establish a clear path for proving post-
conviction innocence. In Herrera v. Collins, 
a case involving a post-conviction claim of 
innocence, the Court focused on defend-
ing procedure, yet expressed discomfort 
in dicta with the Constitution allowing 
the execution of an innocent person. The 
majority in Herrera ultimately found that 
“a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself 
a constitutional claim” and may have a 
“very disruptive effect” on the justice sys-
tem. The disagreement within the Court 
in Herrera and the subsequent conflicting 
jurisprudence about post-conviction claims 
of innocence, has led to a general state of 
confusion in the law.
Despite this confusion, Davis filed a 
successful original writ petition and his 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL UPDATES
case was moved to the Southern District 
Court of Georgia under the “actual 
innocence” exception. This exception 
allows a federal court to hear the merits of 
successive claims if the failure to hear the 
claims would constitute a “miscarriage of 
justice.” However, the Supreme Court has 
failed to establish when innocence is just 
a gateway through which a habeas petition 
must pass and when it falls under the mis-
carriage of justice exception. Moreover, 
courts have employed different approaches 
to applying the “actual innocence” standard 
in determining whether post-conviction 
claims should be heard. While some courts 
balance the evidence of innocence against 
the reliability of the state’s verdict, others 
apply the “extraordinarily high” burden of 
proof standard established by the Supreme 
Court in Herrera.
While Davis’s claim is the first ever 
innocence claim to pass the “extraordinarily 
high” threshold assumed to exist 
in Herrera, the language of In re Davis, 
provides that the district court must deter-
mine whether evidence “that could not 
have been obtained at the time of the trial 
clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence.” 
The Georgia Federal Judge who reexam-
ined Davis’s case after it was sent to the 
District court ruled that the recantations by 
key witnesses “cast some additional, mini-
mal doubt on his conviction,” but “were not 
sufficient for a new trial.” According to the 
Judge, while doubt existed, it was “absent 
a truly persuasive showing of innocence.”
Essentially, individuals lacking DNA 
evidence are stuck in a Catch-22; if a 
conviction is based on faulty evidence, the 
reviewing court defers to the discretion 
of the jury verdict based on said faulty 
evidence to determine whether a defendant 
could be innocent. In a striking illustration 
of this, the Supreme Court has refused to 
hear the appeals of thirty of the thirty-one 
individuals who were subsequently exoner-
ated by DNA. If DNA testing has taught 
us anything, it is that the criminal jus-
tice system is extraordinarily fallible. This 
problem extends beyond Troy Davis: if 273 
people were exonerated using DNA evi-
dence after being convicted beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, one might reasonably infer 
from a statistical perspective that there are 
many other innocent individuals among the 
90 percent without DNA evidence.
The Supreme Court held in Sawyer 
v. Smith that the “Eighth Amendment 
protects against the risk that the death 
penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary 
or capricious manner.” A poignant example 
of this arbitrariness is the case of Marcus 
Ray Johnson who was due to be executed 
in the same chamber as Davis just two 
weeks later, but unlike Davis, was granted 
a stay by a Georgia court in order to investi-
gate new DNA evidence. The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
states “nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .” Surely, this procedural 
equality provided under the Due Process 
Clause is most important when it comes 
to the State’s most severe deprivation, life, 
but with extremely high and undefined 
standards for post-conviction exoneration 
in capital punishment, the justice system 
is failing.
MASS ARRESTS OF PEACEFUL 
PROTESTORS MAY CONSTITUTE A 
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The right to peacefully protest is at the 
foundation of democracy and international 
human rights law, but the line between crowd 
control and the violation of these rights is 
sometimes difficult to define. In some 
cases, such as in Libya, where protestors 
were met with a full-scale military assault, 
it is easy to see the abuse of the right to 
assemble and speak freely. What is more 
difficult to delineate is whether there have 
been veritable human rights abuses in the 
response to the recent string of “Occupy 
Wall Street” protests, which have led to 
mass arrests and accusations of excessive 
use of force by law enforcement.
The national “Occupy Wall Street” 
movement formed as a general protest 
of income inequality and record 
corporate profits during a period of high 
unemployment. The movement has been 
described as “a horizontally organized 
resistance movement employing the 
revolutionary Arab Spring tactic to restore 
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democracy in America.” The right to 
assemble in this manner is upheld under 
national and international law because it 
serves the purpose of allowing a population 
to organize, protest, and exercise free 
speech as an important mechanism of 
political participation.
The First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution as well as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) protect 
protestors’ rights to exercise free speech 
and free assembly. The ICCPR applies both 
domestically and abroad and these rights 
may not be abridged through arbitrary 
arrest or detention, except in situations that 
threaten national security or public safety. 
The ICCPR provides that law enforcement 
officials should use force only as a last 
resort, in proportion to the threat posed, 
and in a way to minimize damage or injury.
Nevertheless, on October 1, 2011, 
Occupy Wall Street protesters marched 
across the Brooklyn Bridge in New York 
City and approximately 700 individuals 
were subsequently arrested en masse by 
police. The Partnership for Civil Justice 
Fund filed a lawsuit on behalf of protes-
tors alleging that police entrapped protest-
ers into illegal activity so they could be 
arrested. This is not an unfamiliar story for 
protestors. The Fund in 2010 won an $8.25 
million class action settlement in a simi-
lar case of the mass arrest of nearly 400 
people in Pershing Park in Washington, 
D.C. Mass arrests such as these inevitably 
involve arbitrary arrest because a crowd is 
not a single entity but a variety of individu-
als, only some of whom may be breaking 
the law while others are well within their 
right to continue in peaceful protest.
While the U.S. government has the 
authority to make reasonable regulations 
concerning the manner in which 
individuals express themselves, the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution guarantee that individuals 
may peacefully express or propagate ideas, 
either verbally or otherwise, in areas open 
to the public. Even a disorderly crowd, 
or the fear of one, cannot be used to stop 
a peaceful demonstration or violate the 
right to peaceably assemble. In Edwards 
v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court held 
that free speech “may indeed best serve its 
high purpose when it induces a condition 
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are, or even stirs people 
to anger.” In light of this rationale, the 
Court concluded that freedom of speech is 
protected  “unless shown likely to produce 
a clear and present danger of a serious 
substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”
The difficulty with what the Supreme 
Court calls freedom of speech’s “highest 
purpose” to create unrest, is that the 
point at which it does so is exactly the 
point at which it can be suppressed 
for not being “peaceful,” making it 
inherently complicated to regulate. 
Though Edwards proffers the subjective test 
of whether the speech is producing “clear 
and present danger” to determine when it 
can be censored, the discretion afforded to 
police officers in crowd control increases 
the risk of both first amendment and 
international human rights violations. Yet, 
as the Supreme Court explained in Hague 
v. Committee For Industrial Organization, 
the state cannot use uncontrolled force to 
restrain freedom of speech as a substitute 
for their duty to maintain order. The chal-
lenge remains to find innovative ways for 
both police and protesters to walk the fine 
line between ensuring safety and protecting 
human rights.
Anna Naimark, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers North America and the 
Caribbean for the Human Rights Brief.
LATIN AMERICA
PERU ENACTS LAW OF PRIOR 
CONSULTATION WITH INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES
This September, Peruvian President 
Ollanta Humala signed his country’s long-
awaited law of free prior and informed con-
sent (FPIC) with indigenous peoples, the 
Law of the Right to Prior Consultation with 
Indigenous or Tribal Peoples, Recognized 
in Convention 169 of the International 
Labor Organization. The principle of 
FPIC requires that indigenous peoples 
be informed, in a culturally appropriate 
manner, about government projects that 
will affect them, and that they be given 
the opportunity to object to these proj-
ects moving forward. Although Humala 
acknowledged that changes for Peru’s 
indigenous peoples would not occur over-
night, the passage and signing of this law 
marks a major step forward in recogniz-
ing many of their rights enshrined in the 
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
(ILO Convention) and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, to both of 
which Peru is a state-party, and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Declaration).
In late spring 2009, the long-standing 
marginalization of indigenous peoples in 
Peru by the government and private corpo-
rations became newly apparent, as protests 
erupted in Bagua province, in northern 
Peru, against the proposed expansion of 
drilling, logging, and hydroelectric dam 
projects in rain forest territory. The vio-
lence that ensued finally prompted the 
Peruvian Congress to pass the FPIC law. 
Despite concerns by former President Alan 
García that the law would hinder economic 
growth by preventing foreign investment, 
President Humala and indigenous rights 
activists argued that the law would actually 
facilitate economic growth. By working 
with indigenous peoples to reach an agree-
ment on economic development projects, 
conflicts like the situation in Bagua will 
not occur. Regardless of the potential eco-
nomic effects of FPIC, Peru is now obli-
gated under both international law and 
domestic law to consult with indigenous 
peoples on projects that may affect them.
FPIC as a right is intrinsically linked 
to many other rights protected under inter-
national human rights mechanisms, espe-
cially the right to participation, the com-
munal right to property, and the right 
to cultural identity. Article 6 of the ILO 
Convention asserts that states-parties must 
consult with indigenous and tribal peo-
ples, through the appropriate representative 
institutions, whenever they are consider-
ing the implementation of legislative or 
administrative measures that will have a 
direct effect on the peoples concerned. 
The American Convention details the right 
to participation in Article 23, and in the 
case of indigenous peoples, this right is 
broadened to include participation through 
“their own institutions and according to 
their values, practices, customs and forms 
of organization.” The UN Declaration, in 
articles 18, 19, and 26-30, addresses par-
ticipation and communal property rights, 
stating that indigenous peoples may choose 
their own representatives and mechanisms 
to participate in decision making pro-
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cesses, and that they have the right to use 
their lands and territories as they see fit. 
Finally, the American Convention and the 
UN Declaration both include the rights 
of all citizens to fully participate in the 
cultural life of their countries and to the 
full enjoyment of their own cultural identi-
ties. Projects for which indigenous peoples 
must be consulted inherently affect their 
cultural life because indigenous culture 
and traditions are so connected to the land 
on which they live.
Peru’s new law adopts much of the 
same language used in the international 
documents, notably in Articles 2, 4, 6, and 
14, which address the right to FPIC, par-
ticipation, good faith negotiation, absence 
of coercion, and inter-cultural dialogue. 
The law states that both indigenous peoples 
and the Peruvian government may identify 
projects that will affect the indigenous, and 
that each side must present their analysis of 
a project’s effects in a timely manner. The 
government must also maintain a registry 
of different indigenous peoples’ represen-
tative organizations in order to facilitate 
information sharing. Despite the ultimate 
goal of FPIC being a satisfactory agree-
ment between the state and indigenous 
people, the government has the final say 
in deciding which projects move forward if 
there is a dispute between the parties.
Peru has joined Bolivia, Colombia, and 
Ecuador, which also have prior consultation 
laws or have incorporated ILO Convention 
language into their Constitutions. These 
countries have set the standard for FPIC 
for the rest of the signatories to the ILO 
Convention by integrating international 
law into their domestic laws. Despite possi-
ble difficulties in practical implementation 
as states and indigenous peoples attempt 
to reach mutually satisfactory decisions 
regarding development projects, Peru’s 
FPIC law will ideally empower indigenous 
peoples to take a lead role in the decision-
making processes that affect them.
MILITARY JUSTICE REFORM IN MEXICO 
AMID INCREASED VIOLENCE
This summer, the Mexican Supreme 
Court proclaimed that allegations of human 
rights abuses perpetrated by members of 
the military will now be adjudicated in 
the country’s civilian courts. The change 
was in response to a lengthy campaign for 
military justice reform by human rights 
groups, as well as the decision of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) in Radilla Pacheco v. México, 
holding the Mexican state accountable for 
the forced disappearance of Radilla at the 
hands of Mexican soldiers in 1974. The 
decision directed Mexico to give its non-
military courts jurisdiction over human 
rights cases involving members of the 
military. The Mexican Supreme Court also 
responded by ordering the judiciary to 
verify whether statutory and case law com-
ply with Mexico’s obligations under inter-
national human rights law. These actions 
are part of a wider attempt on the part of 
the Mexican government to respond to 
international criticism of how the violence 
plaguing the country is being addressed: 
President Felipe Calderón has also pro-
posed reforms to the National Security 
Law; and, last spring the legislature passed 
sweeping reforms to the Constitution, 
incorporating international human rights 
standards language.
In its opinion, the Mexican Supreme 
Court found that Article 57 of the country’s 
Military Justice Code violated Mexico’s 
obligations under international human 
rights law by permitting military person-
nel to only be tried in military courts. In 
Mexico, judges in military courts answer 
to the Defense Secretary, and therefore 
may be hesitant to preside over cases that 
highlight military abuses. This creates a 
culture of impunity, in which soldiers can 
violate their fellow citizens’ rights without 
fear of reprisal. The Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, therefore, is compliant with interna-
tional law and also invaluable for Mexico’s 
efforts to combat impunity and defend 
human rights.
Mexico is a state-party to the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish 
Torture, the Inter-American Convention 
on Forced Disappearance of Persons, and 
the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication 
of Violence Against Women. The IACtHR 
based its recommendations on Radilla 
and three other cases that helped prompt 
the Supreme Court’s ruling on elements 
of these laws. For example, in the case 
of Cabrera García y Montiel Flores v. 
México, the Mexican government was held 
accountable for the illegal detention and 
torture of Cabrera and Montiel by soldiers 
in 1999. In the cases of Fernández Ortega 
y otros v. México and Rosendo Cantú y 
otra v. México, the IACtHR found Mexico 
accountable for the rape and torture of the 
two named plaintiffs, indigenous women, 
by Mexican soldiers in 2002. Following 
a formal declaration by the Military 
Prosecutor’s Office recognizing its lack 
of jurisdiction over these cases as a result 
of the Supreme Court decision, criminal 
investigations about the allegations have 
been moved to the Attorney General’s 
Office and the civilian courts.
In October 2010, President Calderón 
proposed to include torture, rape, and 
forced disappearance as crimes to be adju-
dicated in civilian courts under the Military 
Justice Code. However, human rights activ-
ists rejected the proposal because arbi-
trary arrest, which often leads to other 
human rights violations, was not included. 
Extrajudicial killings, also not included, 
have dramatically increased along with 
other generalized forms of violence. 
Calderón’s proposal did not pass, but the 
Supreme Court’s decision has now essen-
tially superseded it by holding the military 
accountable for all human rights abuses in 
civilian court.
The Supreme Court’s ruling comes at 
a time when accountability and rule of 
law are of ever-increasing importance, 
as Mexico battles against narco-traf-
ficker-induced violence and the resultant 
increased military presence throughout the 
country. Since December 2006 more than 
forty thousand Mexican troops have been 
deployed across the country to aid in 
the war on drugs. Since then, Mexico’s 
National Human Rights Commission has 
reported a drastic increase in the number 
of allegations against soldiers of serious 
human rights violations, including torture, 
murder, forced kidnapping, and rape. The 
violent criminal activity in Mexico has 
undeniably resulted in a far greater num-
ber of human rights abuses. However, the 
military, as an agent of the Mexican state, 
has a duty to protect the country’s citizens. 
This duty is undermined if it too disregards 
respect for human rights.
Military justice reform is a grow-
ing trend across Latin America. Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, and Peru have also reformed 
parts of their military justice systems, 
recognizing the importance of transferring 
cases to civilian jurisdiction in order to aid 
in the fight against impunity. The recent 
Mexican Supreme Court decision is a step 
towards helping Mexico begin to address 
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past human rights violations perpetrated by 
the military, while also promoting account-
ability in the future.
Christina Fetterhoff, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, covers Latin America for 
the Human Rights Brief.
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
NOT WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED: 
HOW THE MILITARY ATTACKS ON 
BAHRAIN’S NATIONAL HEALTHCARE 
SYSTEM UNDERMINE ITS TREATY 
OBLIGATIONS
On March 16, 2011, the Bahrain 
Defense Force (BDF) occupied Salmaniya 
Medical Complex (SMC) in the capital city 
of Manama, disrupting medical treatment 
and preventing ambulances from leaving to 
help those injured in anti-government pro-
tests. According to a July 18, 2011 Human 
Rights Watch report, the occupation of the 
SMC is only one part of the Bahraini gov-
ernment’s systematic campaign targeting 
medical professionals and anti-government 
protesters in need of medical care. As 
a party to the International Convention 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), Bahrain is not only obligated 
to “assure medical service and medical 
access” to all citizens in the case of illness, 
but is also prohibited from curtailing that 
medical access. The systematic targeting of 
patients and medical personnel contravenes 
international principles protecting the right 
to access healthcare established in Article 
12 of the ICESCR.
While the protests that prompted the 
siege were partly in response to similar anti-
government movements across the Middle 
East, they were more directly aimed at the 
Sunni royal family’s attempts to keep the 
Shiite majority out of the political process. 
Bahrain is one of the only Shiite majority 
countries in the Middle East, and the Sunni 
minority is disproportionately represented 
in government. Bahrain reacted to these 
protests by cracking down on dissenters 
in a number of ways, including by target-
ing the medical system. After occupy-
ing SMC and other medical facilities, the 
BDF began the systematic and targeted 
abuse and interrogation of patients with 
protest-related injuries. The military also 
held more than seventy treating physicians 
incommunicado before trying them in 
military tribunals. Reports and interviews 
of hospital personnel substantiate claims 
that the government prevented access to 
healthcare for those injured by participat-
ing in anti-government protests. Although 
the occupation of the SMC occurred dur-
ing a state of emergency declared by King 
Hamad, derogation during a state of emer-
gency is only permissible when the life of 
the nation is at stake, and then only to an 
extent strictly required by the emergency. 
Even if the state of emergency is justified, 
Bahrain’s affirmative abuse of the medical 
community and patients does not serve 
a legitimate purpose protecting national 
needs during a time of crisis.
As a party to the ICESCR, Bahrain 
must comply with Article 12(2)(d), which 
requires “[t]he creation of conditions 
which would assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the case of sick-
ness.” The UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) 
General Comment 14 further informs the 
interpretation of Article 12(2)(d), requiring 
governments to ensure the right to health 
by respecting the right through govern-
ment action, protecting the right through 
government policy, and fulfilling the right 
through legislation.
Though the presence of the military 
at hospitals does not itself undermine 
Bahrain’s commitments under international 
law, any prolonged occupation that involves 
the mistreatment of medical personnel and 
patients as a matter of policy gives rise
to material violations. Specifically, this 
includes preventing international organiza-
tions from rendering aid, and undermining 
the respect and protection required of hos-
pitals and medical personnel. The system-
atic and all-encompassing nature of BDF
attacks on field workers, hospital facilities, 
and the patients and doctors therein consti-
tute disruption of citizens’ right to health-
care at multiple access points. Under the
UNCESCR interpretation of the ICESCR, 
the healthcare system should not be limited 
on the basis of any discrimination, includ-
ing on the grounds of religion or political 
opinion or status. Denying protesters treat-
ment in hospitals on the basis of political 
expression constitutes discrimination of 
the sort prohibited by the ICESCR.
The abrogation of the right to health 
is only a part of the Bahraini govern-
ment’s disregard for human rights during 
the period of political instability in the 
Spring of 2011. The country is still feeling 
the deleterious effects of the government’s 
attack on the healthcare system. More than 
1,400 people have been arrested and 3,600 
dismissed from their jobs since the pro-
tests began, and while the prison sentences 
of those health workers handed down by 
military tribunal were recently overturned, 
this is more placatory than substantive; the 
doctors will still be prosecuted in civilian 
court.
Limitations placed on the right to health 
in Bahrain through the actions of the BDF 
appear to represent a disconnect between 
the rule of human rights law and its appli-
cation. Whether the hospital occupations
and subsequent mistreatment are acts of 
willful disregard or material misunder-
standing, the global community’s response 
to such a gap between rule and implemen-
tation may send a signal to other countries 
in similar future human rights quandaries.
ONE STRIKE, YOU’RE OUT: EGYPT’S 
EXPANDED EMERGENCY LAW POSES A 
RISK TO THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING
In early September 2011, Egypt’s pro-
visional government, the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces (SCAF), expanded 
the country’s emergency law to its widest 
scope since the provisional government 
took power. The SCAF claimed the expan-
sion of the emergency law was a response 
to unrest created by civilian attacks on the 
Israeli Embassy in Cairo on September 
9, 2011. Nevertheless, widespread strikes 
threatening to bring the government to the 
negotiating table just before the announce-
ment likely factored into the decision to 
expand the law’s provisions. According to 
Amnesty International, the law’s expan-
sion represents the “greatest erosion of 
human rights since the resignation of 
President Hosni Mubarak.” In the past, the 
Egyptian government has arrested workers 
for strikes and assembling outside of work 
hours, and Amnesty International contends 
that the frequency of such arrests may 
increase under the new emergency law. 
The working population of Egypt has his-
torically been very politically active, and 
as of February 2011, there was a strike in 
some part of the Egyptian manufacturing 
sector every day for the past three years. 
The expanded emergency law may unfairly 
limit the power of the Egyptian workforce 
by removing critical labor negotiation tools 
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in violation of Egypt’s international treaty 
responsibilities not to impede their usage.
Inter alia, the new measures prohibit 
“assault[s] on freedom to work,” which has 
been taken by Amnesty International to 
implicitly provide for the search, arrest, and 
detention of workers on strike. The emer-
gency law also directs the trials of those 
detained to the (Emergency) Supreme State 
Security Courts, which limit defendants’ 
access to counsel and the right of those 
convicted to appeal. While the provision at 
issue does not explicitly prohibit strikes, its 
character threatens human rights in Egypt 
by giving security forces a broader, more 
general mandate to detain workers and 
disrupt methods of collective bargaining in 
the name of protecting Egyptians’ right to 
report to work, even though the methods 
being curtailed are guaranteed by interna-
tional agreements.
Article 8 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) protects the right of workers to 
strike by recognizing the ability to strike as 
a critical tool for workers engaged in col-
lective bargaining. General Comment 18 of 
the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ESCR), which informs 
Article 8, calls collective bargaining “a 
tool of fundamental importance in the for-
mulation of employment policies. The right 
to collective bargaining is also codified in 
International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Conventions 87 and 98, both of which 
Egypt ratified. Article 3(2) of Convention 
87 guarantees the freedom of workers to 
organize and prohibits public authorities 
from interfering or restricting the right or 
its exercise. Along the same lines, Article 
1(2)(b) of ILO Convention 98 guarantees 
protection from acts that prejudice union 
workers because of membership or partici-
pation in union activities outside working 
hours.
The Egyptian government’s use of 
the emergency law to constrain collec-
tive bargaining would represent a mate-
rial breach of international treaty obliga-
tions. Although the Egyptian government 
arrested workers for striking as recently as 
July, under the expanded emergency law 
the frequency and scope of such arrests 
could increase. The decision by the SCAF 
to declare, even if only implicitly, a pro-
hibition on the right to strike cannot be 
defended under even the narrowest inter-
pretations of these conventions and crosses 
into direct and unequivocal limitation of 
workers’ rights.
The decision to characterize labor stop-
page and other tools of collective bargain-
ing as “assault[s] on freedom to work” 
would unfairly limit methods of employ-
ment negotiation and organization if used 
as Amnesty International contends it may 
be. These rights are essential for effec-
tive representation of the interests of the 
Egyptian workforce and expressly pro-
vided for by ILO Conventions 87 and 98. 
The new emergency law is a step back-
wards for those hoping for a demonstrable 
change from the overly restrictive policies 
in place for decades under the Mubarak 
regime.
Kyle Bates, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Middle East and North 
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A POTENTIAL END TO IMPUNITY FOR 
THE DRC’S WORST WAR CRIMINALS
The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) has undergone horrific violence 
during two wars from 1996 to 1997 and 
1998 to 2003. In October 2010, the United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights released the first compre-
hensive analysis (mapping report) detailing 
the atrocities committed in eastern Congo 
by Congolese senior army officials. The 
mapping report documents human rights 
abuses against civilians, including the use 
of child soldiers, gender-based violence, 
mass killings, and torture. The report not 
only highlights the issue of impunity for 
war criminals, but also offers potential 
solutions to bring such criminals to jus-
tice. One of these proposed solutions, a 
specialized mixed court to try the individu-
als responsible for the most serious war 
crimes, is currently being considered by 
the Congolese legislature.
A mixed court would try war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity 
that have occurred in the DRC over the last 
three decades as well as present and future 
crimes. The court would be composed of 
Congolese officials and both international 
experts and judges. The court is termed 
“mixed” because while it would be situ-
ated within the domestic judicial system, 
it would temporarily employ international 
experts to lend their knowledge and estab-
lish international credibility. A mixed court 
is distinguishable from an international 
tribunal because it would allow for greater 
Congolese ownership and responsibility. 
An example of a similar court is the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina War Crimes Chamber 
(WCC), which incorporated international 
judges to prevent political interference 
but instituted benchmarks for phasing out 
international staff. While the WCC has 
been criticized for its ultimate implemen-
tation of the transition process, it has suc-
cessfully processed numerous cases.
The mixed court concept was initially 
proposed in 2004 by Congolese nongov-
ernmental organizations, legal experts, and 
various human rights advocates as a way 
to hold accountable those responsible for 
the gravest human rights violations. Until 
now, the only criminal actions against 
Congolese war criminals have been heard 
in military courts, primarily against low-
level officials. While military courts have 
made significant efforts to incorporate 
investigation and prosecution standards 
established by the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), they 
tend to be structurally weak and eas-
ily influenced by political interference. 
Because the ICC can only pursue a lim-
ited number of high profile cases such 
as the trial of the former Congolese Vice 
President Jean-Pierre Bemba, the mixed 
court would fill the impunity gap that has 
plagued the DRC for decades.
In April 2011, members of Congolese 
civil society, human rights groups, and 
international stakeholders met to discuss 
the draft legislation and propose essential 
improvements. The suggested improve-
ments include amendments guaranteeing 
integration of international staff, repara-
tions for victims, and assurance that the 
accused will be given fair and equitable 
trials. In July, a new version of the draft 
was adopted by the Congolese Council 
of Ministers and sent for review to the 
Senate’s Political, Administrative, and 
Judicial Commission.
While the proposed legislation is prom-
ising, the most recent draft has aroused 
controversy among the human rights com-
munity because the mixed court would 
be situated within the national judicial 
system, which is also in need of reform, 
and mandates the death penalty for those 
convicted. Human Rights Watch is con-
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cerned that the court could become an 
“instrument of execution.” Another cause 
for concern is the possibility that the inclu-
sion of the death penalty provision could 
dissuade the involvement of international 
experts because many in the international 
community consider the punishment to be 
inherently cruel and inhumane.
Another major concern is the draft 
legislation’s lack of provisions protecting 
the rights of defendants. To be considered 
a fair and effective judicial process, defen-
dants must be provided qualified repre-
sentation. Furthermore, the mixed court’s 
ability to extend jurisdiction to abuses 
perpetrated after the periods of war relies 
on building the capacity of the Congolese 
domestic judicial system. If the State fails 
to mandate fair trials for each of the 
accused, there is a strong possibility that a 
resulting loss of credibility will jeopardize 
capacity-building efforts. As the legislation 
is considered, human rights advocates con-
tinue to encourage amendments essential 
for viable justice, and remain optimistic 
that the enactment of a mixed court will 
combat the Congolese climate of impunity.
AFRICAN OPPOSITION TO THE UN 
RESOLUTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
& GENDER IDENTITY
In June 2011, the United Nations (UN) 
Human Rights Council adopted L.9/Rev.1, 
the Resolution on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity (Resolution). It is the 
first UN resolution to address the rights of 
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) community. The Resolution, put 
forward by South Africa amidst wide-
spread anti-LGBT activity in Africa, brings 
attention to discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation and gender identity, and 
also demonstrates that the rise in violence 
against lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and 
transgender people will not be tolerated.
The Resolution reiterates the funda-
mental rights to freedom and dignity to 
which every person is entitled per the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). It requests that 
the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
conduct a study documenting discrimina-
tory laws, practices, and acts of violence 
against individuals based on their sexual 
orientation and gender identity. A panel 
discussion will be held following the study, 
during the 19th session of the Human 
Rights Council in 2012, with the goal of 
assessing how international human rights 
law can be used to combat LGBT discrimi-
nation, and also to consider discrimination 
eradication strategies for the future.
Numerous African states have opposed 
the Resolution, which narrowly passed 
with twenty-three states in favor and nine-
teen opposed. Among the nineteen states 
voting against the Resolution, nine of 
them were African; they include Angola, 
Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. 
The Resolution has aroused backlash from 
several of these states. In reaction to the 
proposed resolution, Nigeria claimed 
the proposal is contrary to the beliefs of 
most Africans, and a Mauritanian diplo-
mat deemed the resolution “an attempt to 
replace the natural rights of a human being 
with an unnatural right.”
In addition to vocally opposing the 
Resolution, a few African leaders have 
continued to allow and even promote anti-
LGBT legislation within their countries. 
For example, Senegal continues to crimi-
nalize homosexuality in its Penal Code 
despite its ratification of the ICCPR 
and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which require 
states to protect and promote the rights of 
all citizens equally. Several African states, 
including Mauritania, Sudan, and parts 
of Nigeria and Somalia, treat homosexual 
acts as crimes punishable by death. Most 
visible in recent years is the controversial 
proposed legislation in Uganda calling for 
various punishments of all who commit 
homosexual acts and those who support 
them, including the death penalty. In total, 
thirty-six African states have laws crimi-
nalizing homosexuality.
LGBT discrimination and violence 
directed at LGBT individuals is particularly 
rampant in sub-Saharan Africa, with tor-
ture, imprisonment, and murder of LGBT-
identified individuals occurring most fre-
quently. Additionally, the sexual assault 
of lesbians in an attempt to change their 
sexuality, referred to as corrective rape, is 
common, especially in South Africa. Some 
of these violations are permitted by African 
states that have maintained anti-sodomy 
laws since colonization and have failed to 
punish perpetrators of hate crimes.
In contrast, South Africa, where cor-
rective rape is prevalent, has taken the lead 
on combating violence and discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. South Africa 
originally passed a constitutional prohibi-
tion against LGBT discrimination in 1994, 
and in 1996, the Constitutional Court 
overturned anti-sodomy laws because 
of their inconsistency with its reformed 
Constitution. Moreover, in addition to 
sponsoring the Resolution, South Africa is 
currently the only African country to allow 
same-sex marriage.
Despite overwhelming African opposi-
tion and only a modicum of support within 
the region, LGBT activists recognize the 
Resolution’s signal of support for LGBT 
rights and celebrate the UN’s first reso-
lution addressing LGBT discrimination. 
After years of inconsistent positions on 
the issue of sexual orientation and gender 
identity, civil society groups are proud that 
South Africa has set a standard for other 
African countries to attain. Human rights 
activists applaud the Resolution and the 
attention to human rights violations based 
on sexual orientation, and encourage UN 
member states to comply with international 
standards.
Saralyn Salisbury, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers Sub-Saharan Africa for the 
Human Rights Brief.
EUROPE
REFUGEE RIGHTS AND ITALY’S 
RESPONSE TO THE INFLUX OF NORTH 
AFRICAN MIGRANTS
Thousands of African migrants have 
traveled to Europe since January 2011 fol-
lowing the Arab Spring, most entering the 
European Union (EU) through the Italian 
islands of Lampedusa and Sicily. An esti-
mated 50,000 migrants have reached Italy 
this year to date, with weekly reports of 
additional migrants arriving in Italy. Italy 
was unprepared for such a large influx of 
migrants, and its response has highlighted 
the existing divide between international 
human rights principles and the reality 
of implementing those principles on the 
ground.
As an EU member and a UN party, 
several international human rights laws 
bind and impose obligations on Italy in its 
capacity as a receiving state of potential ref-
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ugees. First, Italy must accept any asylum-
seekers requesting entry into its borders. 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights recognizes the right of 
every person to seek and enjoy asylum 
in another country, and the EU Council 
Directive on the Temporary Protection of 
Displaced Persons requires that asylum-
seekers be admitted to the country where 
they first seek refuge. Second, Italy cannot 
expel asylum-seekers once granted entry. 
The UN Convention and Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees espouses the 
principle of non-refoulement, which pro-
hibits the expulsion or return of refugees 
against their will to territories where their 
life or freedom would be threatened. Third, 
as the first receiving state, Italy must pro-
cess each refugee’s application for asylum 
according to the Dublin agreement.
The current migrant situation presents 
difficulties in meeting these requirements. 
Each migrant traveling from North Africa 
has a unique background and immigration 
purpose. Many migrants are Egyptian, 
Tunisian, and Libyan, fleeing states in 
political and economic upheaval stemming 
from the Arab Spring revolutions. Some 
are political and ethnic refugees; others 
are economic migrants. Other migrants 
who were once economic immigrants to 
North Africa are now fleeing the region 
after experiencing increased racial and 
ethnic persecution stemming from eco-
nomic instability. Additionally, refugees 
from Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean refu-
gee camps located in the horn of Africa 
are traveling through Arab Spring states, 
hoping to obtain refugee status in Europe. 
Both refugees and economic immigrants 
are traveling collectively and intermingled. 
Nevertheless, each migrant’s immigration 
status must be processed individually.
The UN Convention on Refugees 
defines refugee as an individual who is 
unable or unwilling to return to their coun-
try of origin due to a well-founded fear 
of persecution based on the individual’s 
race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opin-
ion. Receiving states must first ascertain 
whether a migrant is a refugee, or some 
other type of immigrant. The heterogene-
ity of these migrants particularly requires 
that any migrant traveling through or from 
an Arab Spring country be considered a 
potential refugee upon departure from that 
state. Assumptions otherwise risk the pos-
sibility that true refugees will be denied 
their rights. In light of these facts, some 
Italian responses to the migrant influx 
appear questionable.
Struggling to manage ever-increasing 
numbers of migrants, Italy teamed with the 
EU Border Protection Agency, Frontex, in 
February 2011, to initiate Joint Operation 
Hermes 2011, which focuses on detecting 
and preventing illegitimate border cross-
ings. Prioritizing increased border controls 
has potentially resulted in the violation of 
international refugee laws. Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International have 
reported incidents involving migrant boats 
that Italian officials have either blocked 
from docking in Italian ports or potentially 
failed to aid in distress. Policies preventing 
illegitimate border crossings are permis-
sible assuming they allow for potential 
refugees to freely seek asylum. Without 
any means of accurately and immediately 
distinguishing between asylum-seekers 
and illegal immigrants, Italy’s policy risks 
violating international refugee laws regard-
ing treatment of asylum-seekers.
Italy’s inability to promptly process 
the mass influx of migrants has resulted 
in riots at border control stations and 
immigration camps, and has emboldened 
many migrants to escape the camps before 
processing. Some have immigrated to 
other EU nations, resulting in conflicts 
between Italy and other EU states regard-
ing Italy’s management of the situation. 
The migrant influx occurs at an interest-
ing time in European politics, with many 
right-wing political organizations calling 
for stricter immigration laws. European 
governments will likely find implement-
ing international refugee laws challenging 
considering the current economic situation 
and increasing resistance from right-wing 
parties. Ultimately, how Europe responds 
to the mass influx of migrants from North 
Africa will be a defining indication of the 
enforceability of international refugee law, 
and adherence to guiding principles.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE FRENCH 
LAW BANNING PRAYER IN PARIS’ 
PUBLIC STREETS
In September 2011, France imple-
mented a new law banning prayer in Paris’ 
public streets. Legislators passed the law 
in response to increasingly common occur-
rences whereby Muslim worshippers over-
flow from mosques, spread their mats upon 
the ground, and pray in nearby streets. 
Though technically permitted under EU 
law, the ban focuses more on religious 
practice than on public crowds, and falls 
within a sequence of legislation that 
reflects a French political climate increas-
ingly adverse to freedom of religion. The 
ban on prayer in Paris streets highlights a 
consistent struggle many states face when 
enforcing international human rights prin-
ciples–balancing secularism with respect 
for varied religious beliefs.
Under international human rights law, 
individuals have a fundamental human 
right to practice religion in public spaces. 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) acknowledges the 
right of every person to manifest her reli-
gion or beliefs, “either alone, or in commu-
nity with others and in public or private.” 
Both the Council of Europe Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Article 9, and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, Article 10, mirror UDHR 
Article 18. These documents, however, 
permit this fundamental human right to 
be curbed by statute when required to 
protect public safety, order, health, and 
morale, or when necessary to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others. This same 
struggle between secularism and freedom 
of religion can be found in Article 1 of 
the French constitution, which states that 
France shall be a secular Republic that 
respects all beliefs and ensures equality 
without distinction of religion.
Accordingly, France is within its legal 
rights in passing the ban on prayer in public 
streets. French legislators have likely justi-
fied the law with the public safety excep-
tion. However, evidence also suggests 
some officials have justified the ban as 
effectuating public sentiment toward reli-
gion. French right-wing political groups 
frequently call attention to the growing 
Muslim population and the problems these 
groups believe the Muslim religion poses 
to a secular state. This sentiment seems 
consistent with the legislation’s applica-
tion. The law is designed to reduce street 
crowds and improve traffic flow, but rather 
than forbidding the formation of crowds in 
public spaces without a permit, the law is 
specifically aimed to prevent individuals 
from openly practicing religion in public 
streets. Claude Gueant, the French Interior 
Minister, summarized the intent of the leg-
islation when he said that the streets are for 
driving, not praying, and further declared 
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that praying in the streets is “not dignified
for religious practice and violates the prin-
ciples of secularism.”
There has been minimal backlash to the 
law from the French Muslim community, 
which may result from the relatively small 
percentage of practicing French Muslims 
– 10% according to some Muslim asso-
ciations. Nevertheless, despite claims by 
Interior Minister Mr. Gueant that French 
Muslim leaders agree with the ban, a small 
but angry protest occurred on the first day 
of its implementation.
The ban follows just six months after
the implementation of the law prohibiting 
head coverings in public places in April 
2011. These laws evidence a contempora-
neous struggle within France toward the 
increasingly large Muslim population and 
its integration into French society. While 
many Muslims may not have been upset 
by the ban, their silence does not dimin-
ish French society’s need to reconcile its 
secular roots with its changing demogra-
phy. Nor does it lessen the international 
community’s interest in ensuring that fun-
damental human rights are respected and 
protected, regardless of location.
France faces the challenge of a rap-
idly changing demographic in its society, 
not unlike the challenges faced by other 
similarly homogenous European states. In 
fact, French legislation in response to 
this challenge may have recently served 
as a model to other European nations 
with similar concerns. For example, the 
Netherlands and Belgium recently passed 
laws prohibiting head coverings in pub-
lic places, following similar legislation in 
France. This potential for influence makes 
the legislation in France banning prayer 
in Paris’ public streets that much more 
relevant to the international community at 
large. France will not be the only state to 
confront issues of public displays of reli-
gion, but its response to that confrontation 
may ultimately guide the overall European 
response to increasingly diverse societies. 
How France reconciles its constitutional 
principles of religious freedom and secu-
larism will ultimately serve as an example 
for other European states wrestling with 
similar questions.
Rachael Curtis, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers Europe for the Human 
Rights Brief.
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
ENFORCING THE PROPISKA SYSTEM: 
RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT 
TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN 
UZBEKISTAN
In August, the Uzbek government began 
enforcing residency restrictions in the capi-
tal of Tashkent to prepare for Uzbekistan’s 
Independence Day on September 1, 2011. 
Police conducted raids to identify and 
expel Uzbek citizens without Tashkent 
propiskas (residency permits) in an attempt 
to remove the unemployed lower class from 
the capital city. The widespread expulsion 
of citizens from Tashkent through propiska 
enforcement is at odds with Uzbekistan’s 
international obligations as a party to the 
International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) because it pre-
vents Uzbek citizens from moving freely 
throughout the country and establishing 
residence where they choose.
In a 1999 resolution, Uzbekistan rein-
stated the Soviet-era policy of using pro-
piskas to track and restrict the movement 
of citizens throughout the country. Uzbek 
citizens are now required to live in the 
district specified on their propiska and 
cannot legally obtain permission to live in 
Tashkent. In the years following the rein-
statement of the Soviet-era system, police 
did not enforce propiskas because urban 
redevelopment projects required thousands 
of unskilled rural laborers, many of whom 
lacked the propiskas necessary to remain 
in Tashkent. Now, as these projects end and 
unemployment increases, the government 
cites concerns about the impact of thou-
sands of unemployed citizens on Tashkent 
political and social culture. According 
to an Uzbek diplomat in an interview 
with EurasiaNet, “We have seen crowds 
of young and unemployed youth attack 
government buildings this year in Arab 
countries. We must learn a lesson or risk 
negative consequences.” By enforcing the 
propiska policy, the government seeks 
to avoid a concentration of unemployed 
individuals, to “clean up” the city for 
the Independence Day celebration, and 
to channel the labor force back into the 
cotton-farming industry.
The ICCPR provides the right to free-
dom of movement in Article 12, but also 
deems exceptions permissible when “nec-
essary to protect national security, public 
order, public health, or morals.” Exceptions 
to Article 12 must be “consistent with 
the other rights” in the ICCPR. Because 
the presence of Uzbek citizens lacking 
Tashkent propiskas poses no risk to these 
permissible exceptions and, ultimately, 
infringes upon rights guaranteed under 
Article 26, the propiska policy violates 
Uzbekistan’s international obligations 
under the ICCPR.
The propiska system is not a permis-
sible exception to Article 12 because it is 
not necessary to protect national security, 
public order, public health, or morals. 
The Tashkent nonresidents have not pre-
sented any threat to governmental control 
or caused any disturbance within the city. 
Without a substantial threat to the nation, 
the Uzbek government is not justified 
in suspending the rights of its citizens. 
In addition, UN General Comment No. 
27 interpreting Article 12 of the ICCPR 
requires that exceptions be the “least intru-
sive instrument amongst those which might 
achieve the desired result.” The sweeping 
expulsion of citizens from Tashkent is 
neither the least intrusive method nor does 
it achieve the intended result. Instead, this 
system creates widespread corruption and 
disproportionate oppression on Tashkent’s 
poorest citizens. If the government wishes 
to encourage citizens to leave the capital 
city, it must create incentives (such as fair 
wages and a safe work environment in 
the cotton industry) to promote migration 
that respects human rights and citizens’ 
freedoms.
Permissible restrictions must also be 
consistent with other rights recognized 
by the Covenant, including the Article 26 
right to be equal without discrimination. 
The propiska system violates this right 
in two major ways. On September 15, 
2011, Islam Karimov, the Uzbek President, 
signed legislation allowing citizens who 
own real estate in Tashkent to obtain pro-
piskas. The propiska system also creates 
an environment in which Tashkent authori-
ties frequently accept bribes of around 
$1,000 from nonresidents to obtain neces-
sary residency documents, creating a de 
facto exception for those able to afford 
the bribe. Both provisions benefit wealthy 
citizens and have a disparate impact on 
Uzbekistan’s poor. Because the policy vio-
lates the principles of equality and non-
discrimination guaranteed under Article 26 
of the ICCPR, it cannot be a permissible 
exception to Article 12.
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Because the propiska system is not 
a permissible exception to Article 12, 
Uzbekistan’s propiska policy damages 
human rights protections guaranteed by 
the ICCPR. To address its political and 
social problems without compromising its 
international obligations, the Uzbek gov-
ernment must find a way to encourage its 
citizens to consider issues of overpopula-
tion and urbanization without infringing on 
the right to move freely within the country 
and the right to choose residence. 
NEPAL’S NEW PRIME MINISTER 
GRANTS IMPUNITY FOR CIVIL WAR 
CRIMES
In August, Nepal elected its fourth 
prime minister since its first demo-
cratic election in 2008. Prime Minister 
Baburam Bhattarai, a member of the 
Unified Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist), stepped in to lead the Constituent 
Assembly away from its political stand-
still and toward the creation of a long-
anticipated constitution. Within days of his 
election, Bhattarai signed an agreement 
withdrawing criminal cases against mem-
bers of the Maoist party and other political 
movements who committed crimes and 
human rights abuses during Nepal’s ten-
year civil war. The agreement also granted 
a general amnesty for these individuals and 
groups, protecting those who committed 
war crimes during the conflict from being 
prosecuted and preventing victims of those 
crimes from seeking judicial remedy. As a 
party to the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Nepal 
is obligated under Article 2 to provide 
“effective remedy” by a “competent judi-
cial...authority” for all those alleging that 
their human rights have been violated. By 
granting impunity to members of politi-
cal groups that allegedly caused countless 
human rights abuses during the civil war, 
Bhattarai’s agreement bars victims from 
effective judicial remedy, thereby violating 
Article 2 and demonstrating a disregard for 
Nepalese citizens’ human rights.
From 1996 to 2006, Nepal experienced 
a violent and turbulent civil war as Maoist 
rebels overthrew the Hindu monarchy in 
hopes of a democratic future. During the 
conflict, rebels, including members of 
Bhattarai’s Maoist party, and police forces 
murdered 15,000 Nepalese, and the country 
saw the highest number of political disap-
pearances in the world. As Nepal rebuilds 
post-conflict, the combatants and perpetra-
tors of war crimes, many of whom are still 
politically affiliated, must slowly reinte-
grate into society. Now that the Maoists are 
in power, public recognition of the horrors 
of the civil war through the prosecution of 
these combatants would reflect poorly, and 
possibly detrimentally, on Bhattarai and his 
party. However, Bhattarai’s agreement is 
not the first suggestion to grant amnesty to 
those who committed politically motivated 
war crimes; none of the political move-
ments involved in the civil war want to be 
held responsible for the crimes committed 
during that time. In the years since the end 
of the civil war, there has not been a single 
criminal prosecution for crimes committed 
during the ten-year conflict.
Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR 
requires parties to ensure victims of human 
rights violations have access to an effec-
tive remedy. Article 2 also specifies that 
a competent judicial authority must hear 
victims’ claims of alleged violations and 
that a competent authority must be able 
to enforce identified remedies. General 
Comment 31, which informs Article 2 
of the ICCPR, specifically highlights the 
importance of effective remedy in prevent-
ing future violations and that impunity is 
a strong contributing factor to the recur-
rence of violations. The General Comment 
also emphasizes the detriment impunity 
presents to Article 14, which promotes 
judicial independence, and Article 6, which 
protects against extrajudicial punishment. 
According to the General Comment, a 
nation that fails to investigate and to bring 
perpetrators to justice can itself be in 
breach of the ICCPR because it is not pro-
tecting these essential human rights. 
In preventing prosecution of pending 
cases and granting general amnesty for 
all politically motivated human rights vio-
lations committed during the civil war, 
Bhattarai denies those who wish to pros-
ecute claims against rebels or the former 
government access to the only judicial 
system in which they may seek remedy 
for their harms. This clearly bars victims’ 
ability to receive reparations for harms 
committed during the civil war, which is 
essential both to the individuals’ recovery 
and the country’s ability to move forward. 
Without effective remedy, victims cannot 
receive restitution or rehabilitation, and 
the Nepalese society cannot benefit from 
measures of satisfaction such as public 
apologies, public memorials, guarantees of 
non-repetition, and important changes in 
the country’s laws and practices.
Like many human rights provisions, 
Article 2 of the ICCPR has both positive 
and negative legal obligations. The nega-
tive legal obligations require signatories to 
refrain from violating Article 2. Article 2’s 
positive legal obligations are just as essen-
tial: the state must prevent third parties 
from violating individuals’ civil and politi-
cal rights. As Nepal continues its transi-
tion from monarchy to war-torn territory 
to democratic nation, it will be important 
for the Constituent Assembly to keep in 
mind both Nepal’s positive and negative 
legal obligations under the ICCPR. Nepal’s 
negative obligation can be met through 
the creation of a constitution that protects 
the right to access effective remedy and 
to have that remedy enforced by compe-
tent governmental authorities. The positive 
obligation requires the new government to 
actively fulfill its obligation of providing 
effective remedy by nullifying Bhattarai’s 
agreement and allowing victims to pursue 
justice.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers South and Central Asia for 
the Human Rights Brief.
EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S JUDICIARY 
MAKES INCREMENTAL PROGRESS 
TO UPHOLD HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
Papua New Guinea (PNG) has long 
struggled to protect human rights in the 
natural resource extractive industries. PNG 
is one of the most resource rich countries 
in the Pacific. In 2010 its natural resources 
made up 76% of the country’s $5.9 bil-
lion in export profits. PNG also struggles 
to effectively manage this wealth, and 
was ranked 153 out of 187 countries in 
the 2011 United Nations Development 
Programme’s Human Development Index. 
This economic disparity between the state, 
resource development corporations, and 
customary landowners has resulted in fre-
quent conflict, including PNG’s nine-year-
long civil war. These clashes have also led 
to allegations of human rights violations 
against mining companies in particular, 
ranging from complicity in war crimes to 
extrajudicial killings.
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On July 26, 2011, PNG’s National 
Court decided what could prove to be a 
landmark case for citizens seeking relief 
against human rights abuse by transna-
tional corporations. In Medaing v. Ramu 
Nico Mgmt. Ltd., landowners and related 
third parties sued the owners of a nickel 
and cobalt mine for the harmful environ-
mental impacts of its waste removal sys-
tem. The Appellate Court declined to grant 
a permanent injunction, which would have 
prohibited dumping into the Astrolabe Bay 
on the north coast of Madang Province. 
The decision nevertheless recognized two 
important legal bases for valid claims of 
action against human rights violations in 
the future.
The Medaing case was brought on 
behalf of customary landowners, as well 
as citizens without a proprietary interest 
in the mining site but potentially adversely 
affected by waste removal plans. The 
National Court held that the plaintiffs 
had proper standing to bring their public 
and private nuisance claims due to their 
“close physical connection” and “genuine 
interest” in the land in question. The plain-
tiffs sought a permanent injunction against 
Ramu Nico’s Deep Sea Tailings Placement 
(DSTP) system, which controversially pro-
posed to deposit mining waste at sea levels 
where, allegedly, it would not harm marine 
life. The court ruled that the DSTP system 
was both a public and private nuisance, 
since plaintiffs successfully showed the 
waste dumping would interfere with the 
use of their land, and furthermore cause 
inconvenience, damage, or harm to the 
general public.
Perhaps most importantly, the National 
Court recognized plaintiffs’ alleged 
breach of National Goal No. 4 as a jus-
ticiable claim of action. The preamble to 
the Constitution of PNG delineates five 
National Goals, including the conservation 
of natural resources and the environment 
for the collective benefit of PNG. Section 
25 of the Constitution declares these goals 
nonjusticiable, but provides exceptions. 
The National Court held the exceptions to 
mean that it would not exceed its jurisdic-
tion where “judicial power can reasonably 
be exercised in such a way as to give effect 
to the National Goals.” The court continued 
to describe the National Goals as the “core 
values” of PNG, which should guide “all 
persons and bodies” under the authority of 
the Constitution. After interpreting Section 
25 and ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on 
this claim, the court then held that the same 
exception did not require it to take further 
action. The court continued to cite the 
potentially severe economic consequences 
of disrupting mine operations at this late 
stage in its development, and declined to 
grant a permanent injunction.
The decision is currently on appeal 
to the Supreme Court. While failure to 
achieve an injunction may be viewed as 
a setback, it is in many ways a human 
rights victory. The case was the second and 
only successful advocacy strategy to bring 
a nuisance claim against a transnational 
corporation in PNG. Also, recognition of 
expanded jurisdiction for PNG’s judiciary 
to hear questions on its National Goals 
may have lasting impact. National Goal 
No. 3 calls for “the State to take effec-
tive measures… in particular to control 
major enterprises engaged in the exploita-
tion of natural resources.” National Goal 
No. 5 calls for “traditional villages and 
communities to remain as viable units of 
Papua New Guinean society.” The National 
Court’s decision may thus provide future 
means for legal redress in conflicts arising 
between affected local communities and 
both transnational corporations and the 
state. Goal No. 5 could prove particularly 
important by forcing PNG to protect land-
owner rights and the rights of indigenous 
peoples in transactions to develop natural 
resources.
Absent an international legal frame-
work to enforce corporate social respon-
sibility, potential victims of abuse by the 
extractive industries must rely exclusively 
on the PNG government for protection. 
The Medaing case and its legacy are 
now in the hands of the Supreme Court. 
Importantly, PNG’s highest court acts as 
an appellate body of the National Court 
and comprises of National Court judges in 
ad hoc panels. Should it overturn parts of 
Justice Cannings’ decision, the approach 
giving effect to the Constitution’s National 
Goals will nevertheless make its way to the 
Supreme Court in future cases. Despite a 
setback for the Medaing plaintiffs, PNG’s 
judiciary is embracing its role in the pro-
tection of human rights.
CAMBODIA TARGETS CIVIL SOCIETY 
ACTIVITY WITH REVISED PENAL CODE 
AND PENDING NGO LAW
Cambodia’s increasing exercise of 
authority to restrict civil society activity 
has drawn much criticism from the inter-
national community. In July, a Cambodian 
appeals court upheld what some observers 
consider a groundless conviction on incite-
ment charges against a staff member of the 
Cambodian League for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights (LICADHO). 
This decision was followed in August by 
the suspension of the NGO Sahmakum 
Teang Tnaut (STT), an advocate for the 
urban poor in land rights cases. The five-
month-long suspension lacked clear jus-
tification and cited vague breaches of 
administrative regulations. Together, these 
incidents reflect the Cambodian govern-
ment’s abuse of legal means to enforce 
near-absolute discretion in regulating civil 
society, in particular the revised Penal 
Code and the pending Law on Associations 
and Non-Governmental Organizations.
Cambodia’s revised Penal Code is con-
troversial for creating new crimes and 
expanding preexisting ones to potentially 
threaten freedom of expression. The new 
law took effect on December 10, 2010. 
While eliminating Disinformation as a 
crime frequently enforced in allegations of 
“disturb[ing] the public peace,” the revised 
code creates five new provisions in its 
place. New crimes of Public Defamation, 
Public Insult, and Slanderous Denunciation 
are broadly defined and may be used to sti-
fle opposing political views. Discrediting a 
Judicial Decision and False Denunciation 
to Judicial Authority are also crimes carry-
ing prison sentences of up to 6 months and 
monetary fines. Furthermore, Article 495 
of the revised code criminalizes incitement 
as, “creat[ing] serious turmoil in society.” 
Defamation, Public Insult, and Incitement 
to Discrimination may all be triggered by 
speech or publicly displayed writing or 
drawings. These crimes potentially conflict 
with protections on freedom of expres-
sion afforded citizens by the Cambodian 
Constitution. They may also be used in a 
manner conflicting with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), to which Cambodia is a State 
Party.
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Broad governmental regulatory pow-
ers created under the pending Law on 
Associations and Non-Government 
Organizations (LANGO) contain a similar 
potential for politicization. The draft law is 
currently with the Ministry of the Interior, 
after which it will move to the Council of 
Ministers and National Assembly for final 
approval. LANGO is in its third iteration 
and will impact both international and 
domestic NGOs.
Unlike the voluntary registration 
scheme in Cambodia’s 2007 Civil Code, 
NGO registration under LANGO will 
become mandatory. For foreign organiza-
tions, the law proposes a 45-day approval 
period with no clear grounds for denying 
applications. Only Cambodian nationals 
can establish domestic associations and 
NGOs; this provision excludes refugees, 
stateless persons, and other non-Cam-
bodian residents. LANGO also requires 
groups to notify local government authori-
ties in writing of any activity or training 
event. In addition to the 2007 Civil Code, 
these provisions are contrary to the Law 
on Peaceful Demonstrations, which does 
not require governmental notification of 
“education dissemination activities.” Taken 
together, the provisions not only conflict 
with sources of Cambodian law, but might 
also amount to a breach of the ICCPR’s 
freedom of association protections, and the 
national implementation of provisions of 
the ICCPR to the Cambodian Constitution, 
namely Articles 35, 41 and 42.
Amidst this increasingly hostile envi-
ronment, civil society possesses limited 
means of redress. Cambodia has established 
domestic human rights bodies in name, but 
these bodies are under the authority of 
the Senate, National Assembly, and prime 
minister’s cabinet. Groups could seek to 
challenge the constitutionality of legisla-
tion through Cambodia’s Constitutional 
Council, but they must gain referrals 
from the King, elected officials, or the 
Supreme Court in the course of litigation. 
Such appeals to domestic remedies do not 
encourage optimism in a country ranked 
66th out of 66 countries for corruption, 
according to the World Justice Project, and 
65th for providing effective limits on gov-
ernment powers.
On the 20th anniversary of the Paris 
Peace Accords, Cambodian civil soci-
ety must again look to the international 
community for assistance. Whether these 
efforts will succeed, including appeals to 
the UN by US NGOs and monetary restric-
tions imposed by the World Bank, remains 
to be seen. After nearly two decades of 
foreign assistance, Cambodia demonstrates 
growing resolve to implement a repressive 
legal framework, with rule of law second-
ary to government discretion.
Thais-Lyn Trayer, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers East, Southeast Asia & 
Oceania for the Human Rights Brief. 
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